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NATURE’S PLACE? PROPERTY RIGHTS,
PROPERTY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP
CHRISTOPHER RODGERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE role of property rules in the conservation of nature – the “un-
owned” environment – raises a number of interesting questions. “op-
erty” is a malleable concept that fulfils a number of differing social and
legal functions. It may encompass legal structures associated with the
ownership of objects or land or (in the case of property rules) denote
abstract sources of legitimate entitlement to property. Modern scholars
have, on the other hand, stressed that “property” is not a thing, but
rather the relationship that one has with a thing,1 and emphasise its role
as a mechanism for allocating access to material resources such as land.
Waldron, for example, argues that property rules are, properly defined,
social rules adopted to resolve conflicts over access to and control of
resources.2 As such, they define not only the relationship of power that
one asserts over a resource such as land, but also one’s relationship
with other individuals who claim (or wish to use or exercise rights over)
that resource. In the case of land, this interpretation would require us
to consider how the bundle of abstract property “rights” that the law
recognises will in turn define, distribute and reflect different elements of
resource utility that accrue to the “owner” of the right in question.
This article will examine the role of property institutions in pro-
tecting living natural resources and promoting biodiversity, and will
consider the theoretical basis for a new framework of analysis for
“environmental” property. It will argue that a resource allocation
model of property rights is essential to an understanding of their role
in environmental regulation. Environmental disputes are typically dis-
putes about access to an economic resource. This is certainly true
of the law of nature conservation, where disputes will commonly in-
volve a conflict between the desire of a landowner to use land for
optimal economic purposes (for example for development or intensive
* Professor of Law, Newcastle University. I am grateful to Dr. Alison Dunn, Michael Cardwell and
Richard Mullender for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors that remain are mine
alone.
1 For an eloquent exposition of this point see K. Gray and S.F. Gray, “The Idea of Property in
Land”, in S. Bright and J. Dewar (eds.) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford 1998), at
p. 15.
2 See J. Waldron, “What is Private Property?” (1985) 5 O.J.L.S. 313 at 318.
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farming), and the imposition of land use restrictions by public bodies
in order to preserve wildlife habitats. The role of property rights in this
context is to allocate access to a disputed resource, and to define the
terms on which access to that resource will be permitted by law.
How the law recognises and structures property rights is also an
important issue for environmental governance. It will determine the
design of publicly funded conservation schemes, and will shape the
legal controls on land use imposed by statute. It also has potential
human rights implications, in as much as the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects property rights
from arbitrary state appropriation.3 In Aggregate Industries UK Ltd v.
English Nature4 it was, for example, held that the confirmation of the
notification of a wildlife habitat as a Site of Special Scientific Interest
by English Nature5 was determinative of a landowner’s civil rights to
use and enjoy property, and therefore potentially engaged the conven-
tion rights. In human rights cases the key issue is often the extent to
which land use controls imposed by the state are proportionate to the
public policy interest that is being pursued.6 Even in a human rights
context, however, the central issue is one of resource allocation – it is
about who should bear the cost of conservation measures, and not
about the desirability or statutory competence of environmental regu-
lation.7 The true question is the extent to which the cost of im-
plementing public policy on environmental protection should be borne
by individual property owners whose land use rights have been re-
stricted, and the extent to which it should be borne by the public.
Using a resource allocation model of property rights as a frame-
work of analysis this article will focus, in particular, on two aspects of
property rights theory of central importance to the development of a
coherent theory of “environmental property”:
(a) The need for a new and innovative characterisation of the legal
rules that define and support property rights, i.e. one that reflects
the dynamic nature of the interaction of environmental regulation
with property rights. This is a question that focuses on the func-
tion of property rules in environmental regulation.
3 Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions, but subject to the important caveat that the state has the right to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary “to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”.
4 [2003] Env. L.R. 3, 83.
5 Under section 28(1) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended by Sched. 9 Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000.
6 See Trailer and Marina (Leven) Ltd v. Secretary of State and English Nature [2004] EWHCAdmin
153, [2004] EWCA Civ 1580.
7 See P. A. Joseph, “The Environment, Property Rights and Public Choice Theory” (2003) 20
N.Z.U.L.R. 408.
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(b) How do we characterise the nature of private property where en-
vironmental stewardship obligations have been imposed by
modern environmental legislation? Is it truly “private” property
or should we categorise it as “public” or “quasi-public” property
in those cases where the state has reassigned elements of resource
utility to itself through the imposition of environmental controls
on land use? Waldron’s classification of property relationships8
into private, collective and common property is of particular im-
portance in this respect. The article will therefore conclude with a
consideration of whether we should recognise a new species of
“public”, “quasi public” or “quasi private” property where land
use rights have been restricted, varied or re-assigned to the state
under nature conservation legislation.
II. “PROPERTY”, PROPERTY “RIGHTS” AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
The development of a coherent jurisprudence explaining the interaction
of modern nature conservation legislation with property rights theory
has been hampered by the conceptual uncertainties that surround ideas
of “property” and property “rights” in English Law. At a fundamental
level, notions of “property”, “property rights” and “property rules” are
both multi-faceted and multifunctional, and stress differing aspects of
the relationship of the property holder with land and with other users
of that resource.
When examining the nature of “property” there is an under-
standable tendency for legal theorists to locate property rights within
a framework of ownership discourse. Property is accordingly often
viewed as an abstract construct, characterised by a focus on the pres-
ence of “incidents” of ownership, and of conceptually abstract “rights”
which make up the essential ingredients of ownership. This is often
accompanied by a focus on the legitimacy (or otherwise) of entitle-
ments reflected in property rules. An example of this approach is found
in Honore’s classic analysis of the key characteristics of property
ownership.9 Honore lists ten “rights” which he regards as the essential
indicia of ownership, even though not all need be present together:
the right to possession, to use, to manage, to income and capital, to
security, the incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of termi-
nation and liability to execution.10 Alternatively, “property” might be
seen as based upon “trespassory rules” and located at different points
8 See Waldron, above n.2, 327–333.
9 See A. Honore, “Ownership” in A. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford 1961)
ch. V; and “Ownership” in A. Honore,Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford
1987), 161.
10 See Honore, “Ownership”, above n.9, 107ff.
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on the “ownership spectrum”,11 or as capable of separate assignment as
parts of private wealth. Harris, for example, sees property as comprising
a range of open-ended relationships presupposed and protected by
trespassory rules that may be either civil or criminal in their orien-
tation.12
This approach – viewing property ownership as constituent pri-
marily of a “bundle of rights” – is a characteristic of the western liberal
property concept, which emphasises the power to exclude others as the
central indicia of ownership, and the right of the owner to the beneficial
use and enjoyment of the land and personal property over which
ownership is claimed.13
Theoretical analyses that solely address the role of the law in de-
fining the legitimacy or otherwise of property institutions inevitably
present a rather static view of property rights that fails to encompass
the dynamic and functional relationship of property rights with the
natural environment. In particular, they say little about the role of the
law in shaping and controlling the way in which land use entitlements
are exercised. Modern environmental regulation has an important
role to play in shaping property institutions that are inherently flexible.
It is forward looking, and attempts not only to limit the exercise of
land use entitlements, but also to change and adapt them to promote
environmental stewardship and the enhancement of natural habitats.
Capturing the role of environmental law in protecting living natural
resources requires a theoretical analysis that recognises both the
dynamic function of property rights and their dynamic interrelation-
ship with the natural environment itself.
Many social scientists focus on economic allocation models of
property rights, and tend to adopt a perspective that focuses not on the
legitimacy of land use rights, but on the relationships of power reflected
in property rights and their utility as elements of economic resource.14
In other words, they see the central function of property “rights” in
giving access to a stream of benefits, and the right to that stream of
benefits is viewed as an expression of the relative power of the bearer,
with the holder of a property right able to command certain responses
11 J W Harris, “Private and Non Private Property” (1995) 111 L.Q.R. 421, 425. By a trespassory rule
here is meant a social rule that purports to impose an obligation on all members of society (other
than an individual who is taken to have an open ended relationship with a thing) not to make use
of that thing without the consent of the individual or group.
12 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford 1996), at 140–142.
13 See for example Murray Raff, “Environmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property
Concept” (1998) 22 Melbourne University Law Review 657; Joseph Penner, “The ‘Bundle of
Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 U.C.L.A. Law Review 711.
14 Although the importance of legitimacy is by no means ignored in all sociological thinking
on property: see for example Max Weber, “The Three Pure Types of Legitimate Rule”, in
S. Whimster (ed.), The Essential Weber, a Reader (London 2004), chapter 7.
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by others enforced by the state (through law).15 According to this model
the function of property rights is primarily to provide incentives to in-
ternalise the potential environmental externalities that have emerged
(and continue to emerge) from the growing technical potential of in-
dustrial and agricultural production to generate pollution and damage
biodiversity.16
Economic allocation models posit a dynamic relationship between
property rights and the natural environment. Modern legal scholars
have also stressed the function of property rights as a tool of resource
allocation.17 Coupled with this, much recent research on the develop-
ment of new economic models for property now stress the dynamic
nature of property rights themselves.18 This is an approach with con-
siderable potential for the development of a framework of analysis to
explain the relationship of modern environmental regulation with
property rights. It also has the potential to capture the dynamic function
of legal mechanisms employed in environmental legislation to protect
and enhance living natural resources, such as those in the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 and Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000
discussed further below. Finally, the use of a resource allocation model
of property rights facilitates an evaluation of the effectiveness of legal
and economic instruments that seek to modulate property rights – such
as planning agreements, incentive payments under government funded
conservation schemes and statutory land management agreements.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGMS AND THE FUNCTIONALITY
OF PROPERTY
The necessity for building a theory of environmental property around
a resource allocation model of property rights becomes clearer if we
consider the problems inherent in capturing the dynamic interaction
between property institutions and environmental regulation within a
theoretical framework based on ownership discourse. Two classic
paradigms that categorise property rights by reference to the function
15 L. Libby, “Conflict on the Commons: Natural Resource Entitlements” (1995) 76 American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 997.
16 See H. Demsetz, “Towards a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57 American Economic Review
347, at 348ff.
17 See now inter alia K.J. Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] C.L.J. 252; K. Gray and S.F. Gray,
“Private property and Public propriety”, in J. Maclean (ed.), Property and the Constitution
(Oxford 1999), chapter 2; Waldron, above n.2; W.N.R. Lucy and C. Mitchell, “Replacing Private
Property: the Case for Stewardship” [1996] C.L.J. 566; Raff, above n.13; T.W. Frazier,
“The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory” (1995) 20 Vermont L.R. 299;
M.B. Metzger, “Private Property and Environment Sanity” (1976) 5 Ecology L.Q. 792.
18 See for instance D.W. Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy
(Oxford 1991); I.D. Hodge, “Incentive Policies and the Rural Environment” (1991) 7 Journal of
Rural Studies 373; B. Colby, “Bargaining over Agricultural Property Rights” (1995) 77 American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 1186 (adopting a bargaining model).
554 The Cambridge Law Journal [2009]
of the legal rules that protect property entitlements are those put
forward by Calabresi and Melamed19 and by Harris.20 These arguably
fail, however, to adequately capture the dynamic nature of the inter-
action of modern environmental regulation with property rights.
Calabresi and Melamed classify property rights into three groups.
The land use privileges conferred by property rights can be protected
by property rules, they can be protected by liability rules, or they can
confer inalienable entitlements21. Land use privileges are protected by a
property rule if they can only be removed by a voluntary transaction to
trade the entitlement at a price that is either determined or approved by
the holder. An example would be the common law rules defining the
land use entitlements conferred by a freehold estate in land. These are
property rules because the state, having decided who shall be regarded
as the holder of a freehold entitlement, then leaves the valuation of the
entitlement to the owner and a prospective purchaser if the owner
decides to sell. When, on the other hand, someone is entitled to destroy
a property entitlement by paying a value for it that is determined by
the state rather than by the owner and a potential purchaser, then the
entitlement is protected instead by a liability rule. And, of course, the
state can itself provide for public acquisition of the entitlement
e.g. through planning law or the rules of compulsory purchase. The
rules for determining the payments made under environmental land
management contracts of the kind discussed below22 are also property
liability rules, for the state determines the basis on which payments will
be made in return for environmental stewardship obligations entered
into by the landowner.23 Property rights may also be inalienable if the
law does not permit their transfer between a willing buyer and a willing
seller. Depending on the circumstances, in most cases a property
entitlement will be protected by a mixture of some or all of the three
types of legal rule, according to Calebresi and Melamed.
A similar approach is adopted by Harris, who also categorises
property rules by reference to the function that they perform in pro-
tecting property rights. So, for example, he places property rights at
different points along the ownership spectrum depending on the func-
tions of the legal rules by which a property entitlement is protected. In
the context of environmental regulation, the most important are
property limitation rules, property independent prohibitions, property
19 See G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089.
20 Harris, above n.12, esp. at 35ff.
21 See G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, n.19 above, at 1092.
22 For example Entry Level and Higher Level Environmental Stewardship agreements, discussed
below at p. 568.
23 E.g. under section 50 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Financial Guidelines for
Management Agreements and other related matters (Department of the Environment Transport
and the Regions 2001).
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duty rules and property privilege rules. Harris characterises most
environmental rules as property limitation rules, in that they impose
drastic limits on ownership privileges and powers.24 Ownership use
privileges are therefore overridden and restricted where there is a public
interest in nature conservation which modern environmental legislation
wishes to promote. As this article will endeavour to demonstrate,
however, Harris’s paradigm does not adequately capture the forward
looking role of environmental law in changing the manner in which
property rights are exercised so as to impose positive stewardship
obligations on landowners.
While they offer valuable insights, these paradigms tell us little
about the interaction of modern environmental legislation with land
use and property rights. In relation to environmental regulation, for
example, Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis fails to capture the way in
which liability rules interact with economic instruments. This is par-
ticularly important when considering the success or failure of environ-
mental policy instruments targeted to the protection and enhancement
of biodiversity. Consider, for example, environmental stewardship
schemes introduced under the EC’s common agricultural policy
(“CAP”). Fluctuations in the market price for agricultural commodi-
ties may reduce the compensation payable under environmental
agreements in return for trading property entitlements. Compensation
under agri environment management schemes is determined in ac-
cordance with rules established in the Community legal order, and
based upon the “income foregone” by the property owner in return for
the rights traded.25 The liability rules established in the legal order may
not change at all, but the economic “value” they place upon a property
entitlement traded by its owner in a management agreement may be
fundamentally altered by the market, or as a consequence of changes in
the subsidy regime of the CAP. These issues can only be adequately
captured if a dynamic model of property rights is adopted.
Similarly, most modern environmental legislation does not fit
easily into Harris’s categorisation, which characterises property rights
as founded on either property limitation rules, property independent
prohibitions, property duty rules or property privilege rules. In
Harris’s hierarchy of rules, property limitation rules are identified as
24 See Harris, above n.12, at 35.
25 See Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005, OJ [2005] L277/1, esp. arts 36(a)(iv) and 39. Agri-
environment measures introduced between 1999 and 2006, many of which are still current, were
introduced under the 1999 Rural Development Regulation, which incorporated similar principles:
see Art. 24 Council Regulation (EC) 1257/1999, OJ [1999] L 160/80. Support can also include
payments in respect of the additional cost resulting from the commitment given in the contract and
“the need to provide an incentive”.
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predominant in the sphere of environmental regulation.26 In practice,
however, the impact of environmental legislation is somewhat more
prosaic. Admittedly, some environmental legislation does impose a
simple property limitation rule. Examples here might include the
legislation on listed buildings, which prohibits the development or
alteration of buildings subject to listed building status without prior
consent;27 and the legislation protecting scheduled ancient monuments,
which imposes a similar prohibition of work without prior consent
from English Heritage.28 And of course, it is illegal to undertake new
development, or to make a material change of use of existing buildings
or premises, without planning permission from the relevant public
authorities.29 These are all measures whose primary focus is to impose
restraints that can be presented as limitations on the exercise of prop-
erty, and therefore fit within Harris’s paradigm. As will be shown be-
low, however, the focus of modern legislation on nature conservation is
forward-looking and targeted to changing the way in which property
rights are exercised, and cannot therefore be characterised as simply
imposing property limitation rules.
An altogether different approach30 would categorise property rights
as elements (or strands) of utility that together combine to make up the
constituent elements of a land interest. According to this analysis
“property” consists not of a bundle of abstract rights protected by legal
rules, but rather a bundle of individual elements of land based utility.
As Gray has observed,31 it follows that where there is any addition to,
or subtraction from, the bundle of utility rights enjoyed by a person, it
is possible to argue that a transaction or movement in “property” has
occurred – a proposition of great relevance to modern environmental
regulation. Viewed in this sense, a property right gives a legally pro-
tected right of access to a resource. Moreover, the advent of modern
land use planning, and of legislation protecting living natural re-
sources, has arguably produced a situation where the “property” of the
owner, viewed in this sense, represents merely a residuum of socially
permitted power over land resources32. Where legislation has imposed
land use restrictions in the interests of environmental protection,
therefore, Gray would argue that property has become “quasi public”
26 See Harris, above n.12, at 35, and especially at 41 (“Much of environmental law consists of
property limitation rules – restrictions on what people would otherwise be free to do by virtue of
ownership interests”).
27 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, ss. 7–9.
28 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979, ss 2–5.
29 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 57(1).
30 For example M. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings” (1988) 88 Col. L. Rev. 1667; Gray and Gray, above n.1, esp. at 39ff.
31 Above n.1, at p.40.
32 Gray terms this a “state-approved usufruct”: above n.1, p.40.
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in the sense that the constituent elements of resource utility that it
represents are partly privately owned and partly assumed by the state.33
The primary impact of much environmental legislation is concerned
with the limitation or redistribution of property rights in this sense – as
elements of utility – in order to pursue public policy objectives.
Property rights are therefore fundamentally important to an under-
standing of the impact of the legal and economic instruments used to
implement environmental policy. Gray’s analysis of property rights as
elements of land-based utility34 provides a more promising framework
of analysis for the interaction of environmental regulation with prop-
erty rights. In particular, it can be used to examine the resource allo-
cation function of property rules and to identify the inherent tensions
between the use of public resources for environmental protection on
the one hand and the restriction of private property rights of land use
and utility on the other. Modern environmental regulation plays an
important role in determining and shaping future resource allocation,
and in shaping future land management to enhance biodiversity.
It is not concerned solely with determining the nature and allocation
of existing land use resources and entitlements. A theory of “environ-
mental property” must also, therefore, capture the forward looking
role of modern environmental instruments,35 many of which are
designed to change future land use practices in order to improve and
enhance biodiversity and the environment.
Building on the resource allocation model of property rights posited
by Gray and others, the case for a new theory of environmental prop-
erty can be made by examining two areas of modern environmental
legislation that impact directly upon land use entitlements: the law
protecting designated wildlife habitats, and complementary measures
to promote environmental stewardship in the wider countryside. A key
feature of both has been an increased focus on the imposition of in-
novative obligations of positive land management aimed at enhancing
biodiversity and wildlife habitats. The recent development of the law
also demonstrates, in both cases, that the interaction of environmental
legislation with property rights is much more subtle, dynamic and
varied than an analysis which characterises it as comprising mainly
property limitation rules might suggest.
33 See for example Gray and Gray, above n.17, at 18–20.
34 Above n.1, esp. at p.39ff.
35 For example management agreements with incentive payments, made under the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 and the Financial Guidelines for Management Agreements and other related
matters (DEFRA 2001), made under section 50 of the 1981 Act.
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IV. PROPERTY THEORY AND THE LAW OF HABITAT PROTECTION
The policy of nature conservation legislation towards the protection of
wildlife habitats has increasingly focussed on the use of proactive legal
instruments that enable the statutory conservation bodies36 to impose,
or negotiate, positive management obligations to protect habitats in a
targeted and strategic manner. This development is exemplified by
measures introduced in England and Wales by the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000,37 and in Scotland by the Nature Conservation
(Scotland) Act 2004.
The use of legal instruments to create positive property manage-
ment obligations in order to promote nature conservation is not new.
Planning obligations and planning agreements are, for example, com-
monly used to provide for the future management of the conservation
features of wildlife sites, following development that has been granted
planning permission.38 A good example is the development of the
Cairngorm funicular railway, where planning permission was granted
subject to planning obligations requiring the developer to undertake
baseline monitoring of protected wildlife habitats, annual monitoring
thereafter, and land management designed to avoid the disturbance of
ground nesting bird populations of European level significance by the
increased ski visitor numbers likely to result from the development.39
Applications to the Environment Agency for water discharge or
36 In England this is Natural England: see the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act
2006, section 1(4) and Schedule 5. The statutory nature conservation functions are carried out by
Scottish Natural Heritage in Scotland, and by the Countryside Council for Wales in Wales:
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Part VII, and Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991 Schedule
2. Prior to the establishment of regional conservation bodies by the Environmental Protection Act
1990, these functions were carried out by the Nature Conservancy Council in relation to the whole
of England, Wales and Scotland.
37 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 made extensive changes to the habitat protection
provision in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, which are discussed below. Save for a limited
number of provisions (none of which are relevant here) it’s application was limited to England and
Wales: section 104(4) ibid. The Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, Part 2, replaced the
1981 Act with a discrete code for SSSIs applicable in Scotland.
38 For the relevant statutory powers as to planning obligations see section 106 Town and Country
Planning Act 1990 (England and Wales), section 50 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act
1972 (Scotland). Policy guidance on the use of these powers in England and Wales includes, for
example, provision for their use to mitigate and compensate for the negative landscape and
biodiversity impacts of proposed development: see Department of Communities and Local
Government Circular 05/05 Planning Obligations Annex B Para B16. And see generally Planning
Obligations: Practice Guide (Department of Communities and Local Government 2006).
39 See A Guide to the Cairngorm Funicular Minute of Agreement (Highland Council, March 1997),
and esp. Clauses 6–8 of the planning agreement made under section 50 Town and Country
Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 between the Highland Council, Scottish Natural Heritage,
Highlands and Islands Enterprise and the Cairngorm Chairlift Company Ltd; Planning
Permission BS/1994/254 (The Highland Council to Cairngorm Chairlift Company Ltd),
conditions 27 (baseline habitat monitoring) and 28 (operational monitoring). The grant of
planning permission for the Cairngorm Funicular was unsuccessfully challenged in the Scottish
courts: see further WWF-UK and RSPB v. Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] Env L.R. 632;
K. Last, “Environmental Assessment and the Designation of Special Protection Areas” [1999]
Env L Rev 133ff; J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: the Regulation of DecisionMaking (Oxford
2004), pp. 272–281.
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integrated pollution control permits40 can also give rise to negotiated
solutions addressing nature conservation management issues. These
are all examples of applications for regulatory approval that can lead to
a negotiated result with nature conservation benefits. They therefore
operate in a reactive regulatory context – the use of planning agree-
ments to extract conservation management benefits is dependent, of
course, upon a developer applying for planning permission to im-
plement a project that impacts upon a wildlife habitat. What is new is
the use in modern nature conservation law of proactive legal instru-
ments that enable Natural England and the other conservation bodies
to take action to impose (or, in the case of management agreements, to
negotiate) positive management obligations to protect natural habitats
in a targeted and strategic manner. The legal and economic instruments
described in this and the following section fall into this category, and
represent a new departure in environmental regulation that has major
implications for property rights, and for property rights theory.
The principal measures on habitat protection in England and Wales
are contained in Part 2 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. This
provides for the notification and protection of Sites of Special Scientific
Interest (“SSSIs”) by the conservation bodies. The 1981 Act is heavily
conditioned by the emphasis in UK nature conservation policy of the
so called “voluntary principle”, by virtue of which legislative inter-
vention is aimed primarily at securing the voluntary participation of
property owners in conservation measures. This is an approach that
dates back to the immediate post-war years and the publication in 1947
of the Huxley Committee report on Nature Conservation in England
andWales.41 Following the Huxley report, measures were introduced in
the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 providing
for the notification of Areas of Special Scientific Interest. The law es-
chewed any direct interference with property rights, however, and was
focussed instead on the introduction of a requirement for consultation
with the Nature Conservancy Council on planning applications in de-
signated areas.
The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 greatly strengthened the
environmental regulation of land use, but remained firmly rooted in the
voluntary principle. The 1981 Act was premised on a protectionist
philosophy aimed at preventing damaging land use proposals in
40 Water Resources Act 1991, s. 85 (water discharge permits); Environmental Permitting (England
and Wales) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/3538), Schedule 1, and the Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control Act 1999 (IPPC Permits). IPPC and waste management licences were brought within
an integrated permitting framework by the 2007 regulations.
41 Conservation of Nature in England and Wales, Wildlife Conservation Special Committee Cmnd.
7122 (the “Huxley Committee”).
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areas notified as SSSIs by “buying out” harmful development.42 The
underlying assumption of these provisions was that property entitle-
ments give an absolute right to resource use and exploitation,43 even if
the owner’s land use is environmentally damaging. The legal mechan-
isms introduced in the 1981 Act were therefore a curious compromise
between direct intervention to restrict property rights and the need to
maintain the voluntary principle on which public policy was based.
Section 28 of the 1981 Act imposed restrictions on a landowner’s right
to carry out operations in an SSSI where they have been notified in the
site notification as “operations likely to damage” the conservation in-
terest of the site (referred to for brevity hereafter as “OLDs”). The 1981
Act required a landowner to serve notice on the conservation body of
his intention to carry out an OLD, and then to enter into a statutory
consultation with them before carrying it out. The Act specified a
consultation period of four months, during which it remained a crimi-
nal office to carry out notified OLDs,44 but on conclusion of the
consultation period the owner could lawfully carry them out without
redress.45 These provisions did not, in their original form, apply a
property limitation rule conforming to Harris’s paradigm.46 Protection
of the site would ultimately depend upon the landowner trading his
unfettered property entitlement in a management agreement with the
conservation body,47 or on the secretary of state making a nature con-
servation order to protect the site.48 Ministerial guidance provided for
the payment of compensation under management agreements – either
on the basis of a lump sum payment representing loss of land value or
42 See G. Cox and P. Lowe, “A Battle Not the War: the Politics of the Wildlife and Countryside Act”
(1983) 4 Countryside Planning Yearbook 48–77 and “Countryside Politics: Goodbye to
Goodwill?” (1983) 54 Politics Quarterly 268; P. Lowe et al. Countryside Conflicts: the Politics of
Farming, Forestry and Conservation (Aldershot 1986), chapter 6; Michael Winter, Rural Politics:
Policies for Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment (London 1996), chapter 8, esp. pp.205ff.;
W.M. Adams,Nature’s Place: Conservation Sites and Countryside Change (London 1986), chapter
4 and passim. Future Nature; a Vision for Conservation (London 1997), at pp.37–50.
43 Subject, of course, to planning constraints, which have a limited application to agriculture and
forestry in any event: section 55(2)(e)(f) Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (exemption of use
of land or buildings for agriculture or forestry purposes from definition of “development”
necessitating planning permission), Schedule 2 Part 6 Town and Country Planning (General
Permitted Development) Order 1995, SI 1995/418 (permitted development rights for agricultural
buildings and operations).
44 Section 28(5) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.
45 This procedure was subjected to judicial criticism by the House of Lords in Southern Water
Authority v. Nature Conservancy Council [1992] 3 All. E.R. 481. Lord Mustill referred to the
statutory consultation procedure as “toothless” ([1992] 3 All.E.R. 481 at 484 g).
46 Harris, above n.12, at 35.
47 See for example S. Ball, “Reforming the Law of Habitat Protection”, in C. Rodgers (ed.) Nature
Conservation and Countryside Law (Cardiff 1996), at p 92; C. Rodgers, “Reforming Property
Rights for Nature Conservation” in P. Jackson and D.C. Wilde (eds.) Property Law: Current
Issues and Debates (Aldershot 1998), 48; L. Livingstone et al,Management Agreements for Nature
Conservation in Scotland (Aberdeen 1990); C. Rodgers and J. Bishop,Management Agreements for
Promoting Nature Conservation (RICS Research Reports, 1998), chapter 2.
48 Under section 29 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. This power was repealed in England and
Wales by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 Sched. 10 para. 7; Sched. 16.
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an annual payment representing the “profits forgone” by the land-
owner as a consequence of complying with the terms of the agreement.49
The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 strengthened the law
by empowering the conservation bodies to indefinitely refuse oper-
ational consent to OLDs,50 subject to a right of appeal to the secretary
of state.51 Although this might appear to be a property limitation rule in
the fullest sense, the amended consultation provisions for OLDs are
now even more strongly focussed on encouraging positive conservation
management by the landowner. The 2000 Act introduced a require-
ment that the conservation body serve a site management statement
when notifying an SSSI, containing a statement of their views about the
management of the land and the conservation and enhancement of its
natural features, flora and/or fauna.52 In Scotland, all SSSI notifi-
cations must also now include a site management statement that “pro-
vides guidance to owners and occupiers of land within an SSSI as to
how the natural feature [of the site] should be managed or enhanced”.53
The objectives in the site management statement will provide the op-
erational context within which decisions will be made on applications
for consent to carry out OLDs. Although the amended rules governing
OLDs take the form of a property limitation rule, therefore, their focus
and operational impact will often be targeted to the achievement of the
positive management objectives identified in the site management
statement as necessary to enhance and improve the conservation status
of the site. If necessary, a management agreement can be offered in
which the landowner trades property entitlements in order to protect
the nature conservation interest in the SSSI. It is only obligatory to do
so in limited circumstances, however – for example, where operational
consent has been given by Natural England, but is later withdrawn
or amended.54 Similar provision is made in relation to SSSIs in Scotland
by the Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004,55 although Scottish
Natural Heritage must offer a management agreement in a wider set of
49 Department of the Environment Circular 4/83, “Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 – Financial
Guidelines for Management Agreements”, esp. Para 14 (lump sum payments) and paras 16–18
(annual payments). The guidelines were generously interpreted by the courts and gave rise to very
large (and controversial) payment entitlements: see for example Thomas v. Countryside Council for
Wales [1994] 4 All E.R. 853; Cameron v. Nature Conservancy Council 1991 SLT (Lands Tribunal)
85.
50 Section 28E(3),(5) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, introduced by Sched. 9 Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000.
51 Section 28F. Operational consent granted by the conservation bodies for potentially damaging
operations can also now be subject to conditions or time-limited.
52 See section 28(4) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended by Sched. 9 Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000.
53 See Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 4 (emphasis added). Provision is also made
for the review of the site management statement and its amendment by Scottish Natural Heritage:
section 4(4).
54 See Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended by Sched.9 Countryside and Rights of Way
Act 2000, section 28M.
55 See Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, sections 16–18.
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circumstances than apply in England and Wales. These include cases
where it refuses to grant operational consent for an OLD.56
A harder edge to land use control is imposed if the site is also a
European site forming part of theNatura 2000 network of sites, and de-
signated under the Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations
1994.57 Although the legal controls in European sites are modelled on
those in the 1981 Act, the conservation bodies have more limited power
to grant operational consent for OLDs than applies if the site is simply
an SSSI.58 They must carry out an environmental assessment of any
proposal for operational consent and can only grant consent if satisfied
that the proposed operations will not adversely affect the conservation
status of the site.59 They have power to make byelaws in European sites
prohibiting the killing or disturbance of wildlife, and prohibiting any
interference with the vegetation, soil or other features of the site.60 They
can also apply to the magistrate for a restoration order if an OLD has
been carried out without their consent.61 Despite these additional
powers it remains the case, as with SSSIs, that management agreements
are the primary mechanism for structuring land use controls to protect
European Sites. Indeed, the 1994 regulations expressly envisage the
use of management agreements for the restoration and improvement
of habitats in European sites.62
An analysis that characterises these provisions solely as property
limitation rules is of limited utility. It will capture the restrictions
on land use imposed by a site notification, but fail to recognise that
the law’s primary function is to encourage positive conservation
56 Section 16(9). This is subject to Ministerial guidance approved under section 54. In England it is
compulsory to offer an agreement where operational consent has been granted but is later
withdrawn or amended.
57 The Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2716 as amended by SI 2007/
1843, SI 2008/2172, and SI 2009/6. “European sites” consist of the following: Special Areas of
Conservation (“SAC”); Sites of Community Importance adopted by the European Commission
prior to full designation as SACs; candidate SACs submitted to the Commission pending full
adoption as SACs; Special Protection Areas designated under the ECWild Birds Directive of 1979
(see SI 1994/2716, reg. 10, as amended by reg. 5(9) SI 2007/1843). European sites are designated
under the terms of Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of
wild flora and fauna, [1992] OJ L206/7 (the “Habitats Directive”).
58 As a matter of public policy all European sites in England and Wales are also notified as SSSIs
under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. They are therefore subject to two parallel systems of
land use control – those applicable under the 1994 regulations in European sites, and the land use
restrictions described above and applicable in SSSIs. The administrative discretion of the
conservation bodies to consider a site’s role in a wider geographical habitat of European
significance when considering it for initial notification as an SSSI was upheld in Fisher v. English
Nature [2004] EWCA Civ 663. In Aggregate Industries Ltd. v. English Nature [2003] Env. L.R. 3,
83 it was also held, on judicial review of an SSSI notification by English Nature, that the fact that a
site was to become a European site under the EC Wild Birds Directive was not an irrelevant
consideration provided the criteria for designating the site as an SSSI under section 28 of the
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 were satisfied.
59 Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2716, regulation 20(1),(2).
60 Regulation 28.
61 Regulation 26.
62 Regulation 16.
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management by the land owner. The prohibition on the carrying out of
OLDs in an SSSI is, therefore, a hybrid form of property limitation
rule. It places restrictions on the owner’s land use rights, but it is for-
ward looking and does so primarily to encourage positive conservation
management – including, if necessary, the conclusion of a management
agreement with the conservation body, under which the owner’s
property rights are traded in an economic exchange so as to provide
future conservation management tailored to the ecological needs of
the SSSI or European site.63 It is also a flexible property rule. The site
notification can be varied by the conservation bodies to change the list
of OLDs and, in so doing, further vary the property rights of the
owner – for example to reflect the changing nature of the management
required over time in order to retain or improve the conservation status
of protected ecosystems in the SSSI.64 It is therefore a more complex
species of hybrid property limitation rule than those represented in
Harris’s classic paradigm.65
V. PROMOTING POSITIVE STEWARDSHIP
The wider public policy imperatives underpinning the nature conser-
vation legislation have also changed dramatically since the introduc-
tion of the Wildlife and Countryside Act in 1981. A number of new and
innovative legal and economic instruments have been introduced to
promote positive management of wildlife habitats by landowners,66 and
to prevent damage caused by persistent neglect. These complement the
changes to the rules restricting OLDs introduced by the Countryside
and Rights of Way Act 2000. Like the latter, many of the new property
rules cannot be readily accommodated within existing property rights
paradigms. In most cases they are not property limitation rules at all,
63 See generally Sites of Special Scientific Interest: Encouraging Positive Partnerships (Code of
Guidance) (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2003); in particular paras 9–12
(working in partnership), 25–28 (managing SSSIs), and 37–41 (applications for consent to
operations). The code of guidance sets out advice to Natural England on how DEFRA wish to see
its extensive new powers in the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 used to promote the
positive management of SSSIs.
64 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 28A, inserted by Sched. 9 Countryside and Rights of
Way Act 2000. A site can also be denotified if the conservation body is of the opinion that all or
part of it no longer has special interest: section 28B. Scottish Natural Heritage has similar powers
to amend SSSI notifications under section 8 Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, and has a
duty to periodically review operational consents under section 6.
65 See Harris, above n.12, at 35, and above n.24.
66 See Sites of Special Scientific Interest: Better protection and Management (DETR 1998) Proposal
28 and paras D14-D16; Sites of Special Scientific Interest: Encouraging Positive Partnerships
(Code of Guidance) (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2003) at para. 25
(“the secretary of state lays the greatest store in ensuring that SSSIs are appropriately and
positively managed. Lack of appropriate management is widely recognised as the commonest
cause of deterioration in the special interest. Positive management is most likely to be secured with
the active co-operation of land managers”).
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and can be more appropriately interpreted as a new species of property
rule – property management rules.
The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 introduced new
powers for the conservation bodies to make management schemes that
include positive management obligations for the restoration and
conservation of wildlife sites.67 Where a management scheme is not
being adhered to they can also serve a management notice compelling
the landowner to take positive steps to manage the site and conserve its
special interest.68 The introduction by the 2000 Act of a power to in-
troduce compulsory positive management obligations is probably the
clearest example of the changed approach in environmental regulation
in this area, and one which has obvious implications for property
rights. These powers remain firmly located in the voluntary principle,
however, in that a management notice can only be made if Natural
England is satisfied that they cannot conclude a management agree-
ment on reasonable terms to secure the management of the SSSI
in accordance with the scheme.69 Similar powers were introduced in
Scotland by the Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, which now
empowers the Scottish Ministers, on application from Scottish Natural
Heritage, to make land management orders imposing positive man-
agement obligations both on SSSI land and on land “contiguous” to an
SSSI.70 The Scottish provisions also retain the link to the voluntary
principle, however, in that a proposal for a land management order can
only be put forward by Scottish Natural Heritage if a management
agreement has been offered and refused, where there is breach by the
landowner of an existing agreement, or where the owner or occupier of
the site cannot be traced.71
We saw above that the property liability rules restricting the
carrying out of OLDs in an SSSI are qualified in that they are targeted
to achieving consensual management, if necessary under the terms
of a management agreement with the site owner. The changes made by
the 2000 Act have been supplemented by changes in the rules for
67 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 28J introduced by Sched. 9 Countryside and Rights of
Way Act 2000. DEFRA’s guidance to the conservation bodies envisages that management
schemes should only be used where voluntary agreement as to positive management of a SSSI
cannot be reached with landowners. It is also envisaged that schemes will be used in SSSIs with
more complex management and/or ownership issues: see Sites of Special Scientific Interest:
Encouraging Positive Partnerships (Code of Guidance) above n.63, paras. 29–34.
68 Section 28K(1).
69 Section 28K(2). The use of management notices was envisaged as a measure of last resort, to be
used after extensive discussion with landowners and managers. There is, moreover, a right of
appeal against the making of an order to the secretary of state. See further Sites of Special
Scientific Interest: the Governments Framework or Action (DETR 1999) at p5.
70 See Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 30. If made, an order can impose both
positive obligations on the landowner (“operations which are to be carried out on the land for the
purpose of conserving restoring or otherwise enhancing” the natural features of the site) and
restrictions on damaging operations: see section 31(1)(d)(e).
71 See Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 29(2)–(4).
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management agreements in SSSIs, which now require that positive
conservation management be provided in return for public funding. By
giving Natural England an indefinite power to refuse operational con-
sent for OLDs, the 2000 Act fundamentally changed the balance of
power in negotiations over operational consents and management
agreements. It also amply demonstrates that the law is no longer pre-
mised on the assumption that landowners have unlimited land use
rights, irrespective of the environmental damage to which their exercise
may give rise72, and that the property rights that can be traded by the
landowner in an economic exchange are now accordingly more limited.
New Financial Guidelines for Management Agreements were pub-
lished in 2001, making fundamental changes to the way in which
payments for agreements on European sites and SSSI land will be
calculated.73 Under the revised guidelines, payments are now made for
positive conservation work carried out in SSSIs and European sites,
rather than for profits foregone by landowners not able to carry out
OLDs that have been “bought out” by the agreement. The use of
management agreements in SSSIs is, under the 2001 guidelines, in-
creasingly focussed on the imposition of positive land management to
recreate and improve natural habitats, rather than on land use restric-
tions aimed simply at preserving the status quo ante. In England and
Wales, the principal habitat protection schemes are based upon a new
generation of “positive” management agreements that typically impose
obligations to manage land for environmental improvement and habi-
tat recreation, with incentive payments for capital works of conser-
vation benefit, such as providing traditional hedges and dry stone
walls, recreating upland heather habitats or recreating wetlands. In
England this development is typified by the Wildlife Enhancement
Scheme (“WES”) administered by Natural England. The use of man-
agement agreements under schemes like WES is strategically targeted
to specific habitat restoration objectives in SSSIs. Furthermore, em-
pirical research increasingly suggests that the statutory consultation
provision for OLDs, which is essentially a reactive mechanism, is now
infrequently used by landowners and rarely leads to the conclusion of a
management agreement to protect SSSI habitats.74
72 This was, of course, the underlying premise on which the measures in the Wildlife and Countryside
Act 1981 were originally based: above n.42 and 43.
73 Guidelines on Management Agreement Payments and other related matters (DETR 2001), made
under Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 50.
74 See research data at p.30 and Annex E of Management Agreements for Promoting Nature
Conservation (C. Rodgers and J. Bishop, RICS Research Report, 1998). Only 18% of landowners
with agreements in the research sample were found to have served notice of intention to carry out
OLDs prior to being offered a management agreement. 82% of agreements had been secured
through a unilateral approach from the conservation body. The use of the statutory consultation
mechanism increased slightly when a chartered surveyor represented the landowner in
negotiations with English Nature, but only to 25% of respondents. More recent research
involving SSSIs on common land found that the use of the section 28 provisions is now extremely
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The changed emphasis in the rules underpinning management
agreements in SSSIs is also reflected in provisions for management
agreements in the wider countryside. Environmental land management
schemes that will attract incentive payments are governed by rules in
the EC Rural Development Regulation.75 Alongside this, following re-
form of the CAP in 2003 most direct support payments to farmers are
now subsumed within the Single Farm Payment scheme, “decoupled”
from production and subject to “cross compliance”, i.e. environmental
conditionality by which payment is conditional upon the observance
of basic land management prescriptions targeted to environmental
protection and animal welfare.76 In general terms77 cross compliance
measures are targeted at protecting the rural environment, as it now
exists, while the improvement or enhancement of farmland biodiversity
is a matter for agri environment schemes introduced under the Rural
Development Regulation that provide incentive payments for habitat
improvement or restoration. In order to qualify for environmental
stewardship payments, however, farmers must meet conditions going
beyond what is required by “good agricultural practice”.78 Landowners
will, in other words, be expected to bear environmental compliance
costs up to a reference level of good agricultural practice reflected in
property rights.79 The CAP reform attempted to apply the Polluter Pays
principle of EC environmental law to the agriculture sector.80 The
express incorporation of environmental management standards within
property rights by the legal order for the CAP represents a fundamental
shift away from the philosophy that underpinned earlier UK legislation,
such as the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act. It also complements,
rare: see qualitative research data at http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies (AHRC research
project AH/E510310, Contested Common Land; Environmental Governance, Law and Sustainable
Land Management c.1600–2006).
75 Currently Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005, Oj [2005] L277/1, formerly Council Regulation
(EC) 1257/1999, OJ [1999] L160/80. Most agri-environment schemes currently in force in England
and Wales were approved under the 1999 Regulation.
76 See generally arts. 4 and 5, and Annex 111 of Council Regulation 1782/2003, OJ [2003] L 270/1
(the “2003 Horizontal Regulation” imposing common rules for the payment of the single farm
payment).
77 See J. Dwyer et al, Cross Compliance under the Common Agricultural Policy: a report to the
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Institute for European Environmental
Policy, 2000); M. Cardwell, The European Model of Agriculture (Oxford 2003), at 246–252.
78 “The philosophy underpinning the environmental aspects of the CAP reforms is that farmers
should be expected to observe basic environmental standards without compensation. However,
where society demands that farmers deliver an environmental service beyond the base line level,
this service should be specifically purchased through the agri-environment measures”: Directions
Towards Sustainable Agriculture, COM (1999) 22 Final at para 3.2.1.
79 Indicators for the Integration of Environmental Concerns into the Common Agricultural Policy,
COM (2000) 20 Final. The implications of the Agenda 2000 reform of agriculture policy for
property rights theory is considered further in an earlier article: see C.P. Rodgers, “Agenda 2000,
Land Use and the Environment: Towards a Theory of Environmental Property Rights?” in
J. Holder and C. Harrison (eds.), Law and Geography (Oxford, 2003), pp.239–258.
80 Art 174.2 EC Treaty. See generally M. Cardwell, “The Polluter Pays Principle in European
Community Law and its Impact on UK Farmers” (2006) 59 Oklahoma Law Review 89, esp. at
101ff.
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therefore, the changes to the law habitat protection made by the
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 and Nature Conservation
(Scotland) Act 2004, and discussed above.
These rules now underpin the principal agri-environment scheme in
England – the Environmental Stewardship Scheme – which adopts a
“whole farm” approach and is based on a “public goods model”
under which positive management for conservation is purchased by
the state.81 Payments for environmental land management are made
under one of three optional elements within a stewardship agreement:
Entry Level Stewardship (“ELS”), Organic Entry Level Stewardship
(“OELS”) and Higher Level Stewardship (“HLS”).82 Entry is depen-
dent on the applicant achieving the relevant points score for manage-
ment undertakings under each of the three elements of the scheme.83
So for example, under an agreement with an ELS element the farmer
must undertake to carry out on his “conventional land” sufficient ELS
options to meet his ELS points’ target, typically 30 points for each
hectare of his conventional (non-organic) land.84 Farmers receive
£30 per hectare for land entered into the scheme, with supplementary
capital payments for habitat restoration work. Payments under Higher
Level Stewardship agreements are made on the basis of specific works
under one of a number of closely targeted conservation programmes
e.g. heather regeneration in the uplands. In Wales, similar objectives
are pursued through the Tir Gofal and Tir Cynnal agri-environment
schemes, which (like the Environmental Stewardship Scheme in
England) are premised on a positive conservation ethic with payments
for habitat recreation, whole farm management and payments for
capital works of environmental benefit. Although participation in agri-
environment schemes is voluntary, they are commonly used to deliver
the environmental management of conservation features on many
SSSIs and European sites.
VI. RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL PROPERTY THEORY
To what extent can the relationship between environmental regulation
and the property rules outlined above, especially those imposing
81 Environmental Stewardship (England) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/621, made under section 2(2)
European Communities Act 1972 and section 98 Environment Act 1995. Environmental
Stewardship is administered by Natural England.
82 SI 2005/621, reg, 3, Detailed prescriptions are set out in the Schedule to the 2005 regulations, with
basic prescriptions for ELS agreements in Schedule 2 Part 2 and more advanced prescriptions for
inclusion in HLS agreements in Part 3 of Schedule 2.
83 See reg. 5 (2) (ELS), 5(3) (OELS), and also reg. 5(4) in relation to HLS obligations to be included
in the agreement.
84 Schedule 3 paragraph 1. For the definition of “conventional land” see reg. 2 (“agreement land
which is not organic land”). In relation to land within the less favoured area (for example upland
semi-natural grazing), and which comprises all or part of a parcel of at least 15 hectares, the target
is only 8 points per hectare.
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positive management obligations, be explained by extant property
rights scholarship? And how are we to characterise the nature of land
over which positive management obligations are imposed to further the
public interest in nature conservation?
A Classifying Property Management Obligations
Legal rules requiring positive land management, whether imposed by
statute, within a contractual framework or through the administrative
arrangements for agricultural support, cannot be satisfactorily classi-
fied simply as property-limitation rules. The same can be said for the
legal restrictions on carrying out OLDs in an SSSI, which fulfil the dual
role of preventing damage to protected sites while at the same time
encouraging consensual conservation management. The primary focus
of all these rules is the requirement of positive land management in
accordance with an established normative standard, a common feature
that characterises them as a type of property-duty rule. They do not,
however, fit within existing property rights paradigms. Harris, for ex-
ample, recognises the distinction between property-liability rules and
property-duty rules when classifying different categories of property
right, but locates property-duty rules in the imposition of obligations
on the land owner that have nothing to do with the exercise of owner-
ship privileges.85
Environmental rules of this kind are arguably a new species of
property rule in that they impose positive obligations as an attribute
of the exercise of ownership privileges. They do not limit or remove
property rights or land use privileges, but impose positive obligations
that condition the manner in which they are exercised. A landowner
remains free to adopt the type of land use he wishes on his land. He
may, for example, choose whether to set aside some of his land for a
nature reserve, or (if a farmer) to use some or all of his land for intensive
arable, dairy or livestock farming. In the case of land used for farming
purposes, however, the law now requires him to manage it according
to normative standards of good agricultural practice, and to comply
with cross compliance conditions that apply to the type of agricultural
land use that he has chosen.86 He may also be offered a management
agreement with incentive payments for positive management to recre-
ate or improve habitat features on his land, either under an agri-
environmental scheme or under one of the incentive schemes applicable
in SSSIs.
The new techniques of environmental regulation exemplified by
management schemes and land management orders in SSSIs, and by
85 Harris, above n.12, at 37.
86 Unless he chooses not to claim the single farm payment, in which case the cross compliance
conditions will not apply to constrain his land management decisions.
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normative environmental management standards in the legal order for
the CAP, are not based upon property-duty rules in the sense under-
stood by Harris. Neither are they property rules in the sense under-
stood by Calebresi and Melamed.87 They are instead, it is suggested, a
new category of property-management rule.
The distinction between property-duty rules, property-liability rules
and the new species of property-management rule becomes clear if
we consider the role of each, and their interaction, in relation to an
economic exchange by which property entitlements are traded for en-
vironmental services, such as a management agreement in an SSSI.
Protection of an interest by a property rule normally suggests that its
owner’s wishes will be preferred to those of the other contracting par-
ties, unless he decides to voluntarily reassign his control.88 Property-
management rules have an entirely different impact to property rules of
this kind. Their imposition is intended to prosecute a public interest
objective – nature conservation – rather than to protect the property
owner’s rights per se. Property management rules do this not by ap-
propriating ownership of the resource (land) to the state, but by con-
trolling the terms on which access to the resource is permitted. The
restrictions on carrying out OLDs in an SSSI have, for example, the
effect of transferring elements of resource utility to the state, and of re-
stricting those elements of resource utility that the owner can exercise
without permission from the conservation bodies. Viewed in these
terms, it could be argued that the restriction on carrying out OLDs in
an SSSI is actually a hybrid form of property-management and prop-
erty limitation rule, because the land use restrictions in the site notifi-
cation can be varied at any time by the conservation body if the
restoration, enhancement or protection of the site’s natural features so
require. Although it imposes land use restrictions, the rule’s primary
role is to ensure appropriate conservation management of the site.
This is achieved by imposing a dynamic and hybrid form of property
limitation/management rule – one that is flexible, subject to change,
and focussed to achieving the conservation management of the site
required by the site management statement for the SSSI.
The dynamic role of property management rules in environmental
regulation can also be illustrated by the application of an economic
“bargaining” model of property rights.89 In the negotiation of an in-
terdependence by which property rights are subsequently reassigned,
such as a management agreement, the scope of those rights that the
87 Calabresi and Melamed, above n.19, 1092–1093,1106–1110.
88 See generally, for instance, R. Griffin., “Welfare and Institutional Choice” (1991) 73 American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 601.
89 See for example B. Colby, “Bargaining over Agricultural Property Rights” (1995) 77 American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 1186.
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property owner can bargain and reassign is correspondingly reduced
where a property management rule has been applied by legislation.
In principle he still has unfettered property rights, but his freedom
to bargain them away is restricted. In the case of an SSSI it will be
restricted by the rules against carrying out OLDs without written per-
mission from the conservation body or under the terms of a manage-
ment agreement.90 And whether the land is within an SSSI or not it will,
if an agri-environment agreement is being negotiated, be restricted by
the absorption of the rules of good agricultural practice into normative
standards of land management for which the state will not make in-
centive payments available.
The bargaining model stresses that property rules are fundamental
to the operation of markets. The terms of the exchange that the parties
voluntarily agree (for example in a management agreement) will depend
on the alternatives available to them if a market transaction cannot be
negotiated. Environmental regulation that constrains land manage-
ment choices and diminishes net returns fundamentally alters the fac-
tual negotiating matrix – it impacts upon the alternatives available to a
landowner negotiating an exchange such as a management agreement,
thereby reducing his bargaining power, and correspondingly reduces
his ability to negotiate terms allocating a higher value to the rights he is
willing to reassign.91
B Towards a Theory of “Environmental” Property?
What is the nature of property that is subjected to rules of this kind by
modern nature conservation legislation? Waldron classifies property
relationships92 into private, collective and common property, and views
property as primarily a medium for allocating use rights in resources
such as land. Property rules dictate how scarce material resources are
to be used (and land is, of course, a classic example in this context).93
The private property solution to this problem is to allocate the final
decision in disputes over access to resources to a particular individual
(the “owner”).
Land that is subject to a property rule imposed by nature conser-
vation legislation cannot be categorised as purely private, for the
legislation reallocates decision making on key aspects of its use to the
state. How, then, does it fit within Waldron’s classification of property
relationships into private, collective and common property? Consider
the restrictions on land use imposed in SSSIs by the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 and Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004.
90 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 28E (3) as amended Sched. 9 Countryside and Rights
of Way Act 2000.
91 See further Colby, above n. 89.
92 See Waldron, above n.2 at 327–333.
93 Waldron, above n.2, 342.
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The final decision on the allocation and exercise of land use rights here
depends upon whether the rights in question involve operations that
have been notified as likely to damage the conservation interest of the
site.94 In the case of land uses that do not involve notified operations,
the final decision remains with the owner; but in the case of operations
notified as likely to damage the conservation interest of the site it is
reallocated to the state.95 The relationship cannot be categorised as one
of “collective” property, however, as the conservation bodies are not
themselves given direct access to the use of the resource (i.e. the land)96.
Neither is it common or communal property,97 as the public at large
have no right to use the land or, indeed, to be consulted on the grant or
refusal of operational consent to OLDs proposed by the landowner.98
It is therefore difficult to categorise this type of property relation-
ship as either simply “private” or “public” – indeed it illustrates very
clearly Kevin Gray’s observation that there is no clear distinction (or
“clean break”) between private and public property relationships, but
rather a multitude of fine distinctions or gradations between the two.99
Nevertheless, the key attribute of a private property system lies in the
fact that it allocates to a certain specified person (rather than society
as a whole) the right to determine how a specified resource (in our
case land) is to be used.100 In as much as both the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 and Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004
leave the primary responsibility for determining the choice of land use
to the owner, and limit themselves to restricting specified “operations
likely to damage” the conservation interest of protected sites, it may
be more appropriate to characterise property subject to this type of
environmental regulation as “quasi-private”, rather than as collective,
common or quasi-public property.101
94 I.e. notified as OLDs to the owner or occupier in the site notification. See Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 section 28E (England and Wales), and Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act
2004 section 16 (Scotland).
95 Represented by the statutory conservation bodies, i.e. Natural England, the Countryside Council
for Wales or Scottish Natural Heritage (above n.36).
96 Although they may acquire a right to enter the land and carry out works of conservation
management in limited circumstances – principally when the owner has failed to comply with a
management order made under section 28J of the 1981 Act. If the owner or occupier of the land
concerned fails to comply with the terms of a management order the conservation body can enter
the land to carry out the operations ordered themselves, and recover the reasonable cost of doing
so from the owner: section 28P(8) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.
97 As to which see Waldron above n.2, 329–339; Lucy and Mitchell, above n.17, at 580ff.
98 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 28E(1), (4), as inserted by Sched. 9 Countryside and
Rights of Way Act 2000; Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 16(1)–(3). The 1981
Act provides for a “closed” consultation between the conservation body and the landowner in
these cases, with no provision for the public to be notified of the proposal or consulted as to
whether consent should be granted.
99 See Gray and Gray, above n.17, esp. at 18–20.
100 Waldron, above n.2, 348.
101 Gray and Gray, above n.17, at 18ff. uses the broad concept of “quasi public property” to describe
the gradations of public control of access and use of resources prevalent in modern legislation.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of property rights has moved a long way since
Blackstone’s well known, but outmoded, dictum that property com-
prises “that sole or despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe”.102 Nevertheless, this
article has attempted to demonstrate that in order to develop a frame-
work of analysis for “environmental” property rights – one that re-
cognises the role of property institutions in protecting and enhancing
biodiversity – we must fundamentally reappraise several aspects of
existing property rights theory.
First, it is essential to recognise that a new species of property rule
has emerged to promote nature conservation and enhance biodiversity.
It is no longer possible to characterise property rules exclusively
as property liability rules, property limitation rules or property-
independent rules. The analyses offered by leading theorists like
Harris103 and Melamed and Calabresi,104 do not capture the dynamic
relationship between property institutions and modern environmental
regulation. Property management rules are a paradigm of a new gen-
eration of property rules introduced to further the collective interest in
promoting nature conservation. These rules are best located within a
resource allocation model of property rights, but understanding their
status and function as an allocative rule requires a reappraisal of
property rights theory.
Property management rules of the type described in this paper105
dictate that the state decides not by whom a resource such as land is
used – but rather how, when and in what manner that resource is used.
In this sense the property over which the property management rule
applies remains “private” property. The inclusion of a prohibition on
drainage in a SSSI notification affecting farmer X’s land does not
prevent him draining his land. Rather, it requires him to consult the
conservation body before he does so, and prohibits him from carrying
out this potentially damaging operation without its consent. In prac-
tice, in the majority of cases they will permit the landowner to carry out
notified operations in a modified manner that is not environmentally
damaging, or offer him a management agreement to manage the site in
a manner beneficial to its conservation status.
102 See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (repr. Chicago 1979), vol. II, p.2.
103 Above n. 12.
104 Above n. 19.
105 For example those in a management scheme or management notice, or in a land management
order imposed by the conservation bodies on SSSI land (as to which see the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981, section 28J; Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 section 30).
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Finally, it is necessary to recognise the dynamic role of property
rules in protecting and promoting biodiversity. The law has developed
entirely new legal mechanisms to apply property management rules and
to enforce positive management prescriptions tailored to nature con-
servation. If biodiversity is to be protected and enhanced, the law must
adopt a forward-looking stance that allows property rules to adapt and
change as ecology and ecosystems change and adapt. The use of me-
chanisms such as management schemes and land management orders in
SSSIs, and of management agreements with obligations tailored to
specific habitat types, provides clear examples of new legal instruments
that facilitate the adjustment and manipulation of property rights in
order to do just this. Legal scholarship must also recognise the need for
an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the interaction of prop-
erty rights with the natural environment. Economics, applied biology
and agricultural science have, for example, an important role to play in
furthering our understanding of the operation of property management
rules and of their effectiveness in protecting ecosystems and wildlife
habitats.
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